r 


Department  of  History  and  International 
Relations 

CLARK  COLLEGE 

Worcester,  Mass. 

A  Preliminary  Syllabus 
for  a  Study  of 

The  Issues  of  the 
Present  War 

PART  I 
HISTORICAL 

Praparod 


Harry  E.  Barnes,  Ph.D. 
Associate  Professor  of  History 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2014 


https://archive.org/details/preliminarysyllaOOhulb 


THE  ISSUES  OF  THE  PRESENT  WAR 


I.    Germanic  Origins 

1.  The  "Aryan  myth." 

2.  Primitive  nature  of  German  society  at  the  close  of  the  5th  century  A.D. 

3.  The  Freeman-Kemble-Green-Burgess  fiction  respecting  the  Germanic 
origins  of  modern  democracy  and  of  t he  peculiar  political  capacity 
of  the  Germans. 

II.    The  Medieval  Germanic  States 

1.  Charlemagne's  Empire. 

2.  The  Holy  Roman  Empire. 

A.  The  lure  of  Ancient  Rome. 

B.  Effect  of  the  policies  of  the  Medieval  Empire  on  the  formation 
of  a  German  national  state. 

C.  The  influence  of  the  Empire  on  German  historical  and  political 
traditions. 

3.  The  failure  to  establish  a  German  national  state  in  medieval  or  early 
modern  times. 

A.  Backwardness  as  compared  with  France,  England,  and  Spain. 

B.  Increasing  impotence  of  the  Medieval  Empire. 

C.  Consequences  of  the  delayed  origin  of  a  German  national  state. 

III.    The  Rise  of  Prussia 

1 .  Brandenburg  before  1415. 

2.  The  Hohenzollerns  prior  to  1415. 

3.  The  sale  of  the  Margraviate  of  Brandenburg  to  the  Hohenzollern 
Burgrave  of  Nuremberg  by  the  Emperor  Sigismund,  1415. 

A.    Frederick  of  Nuremberg,  the  first  Hohenzollern  Margrave  of 
Brandenburg,  1415-40. 

4.  The  Evolution  of  the  Margraviate  of  Brandenburg  into  the  Kingdom 
of  Prussia,  1415-1701. 

A.  Prussia  and  the  Teutonic  Knights,  1231-1618. 

(1)  Hohenzollern  domination  of  the  Knights  and  control  of 
Prussia. 

B.  Personal  union  of  Brandenburg  and  Prussia,  1618. 

C.  The  work  of  Frederick  William  the  Great  Elector,  1640-88. 
(1)  The  "foundations  of  Prussian  policy." 

D.  The  Kingdom  of  Prussia,  1701. 

(1)  Why  Kingdom  of  Prussia  and  not  of  Brandenburg. 

(2)  Submergence  of  Brandenburg  in  Prussia. 


4 


CLARK  UNIVERSITY 


IV    The  Development  of  Prussia  into  a  European  Power  and 
the  Establishment  of  Prussian  Hegemony  in  Germany. 

1.  Great  expansion  of  Prussian  power  and  prestige  in  the  eighteenth 
century. 

A.  Frederick  William  I,  1713-40. 

(1)  Perfection  of  the  military  state. 

(2)  Growth  of  administrative  bureaucracy. 

(3)  Paternalistic  despotism. 

B.  Frederick  the  Great,  1740-86,  and  the  first  humiliation  of  Austria 
by  Prussia. 

(1)  Realpolilik. 

a.  The  violation  of  the  Pragmatic  Sanction  and  the  seizure 
of  Silesia. 

b.  Desertion  of  his  allies,  1745. 

c.  Partition  of  Poland,  1772. 

(2)  Salvation  of  Prussia  by  England  and  Russia. 

(3)  The  Hohenzollems  become  the  peers  of  the  Hapsburgs. 

(4)  Reasons  why  Prussia  did  not  form  a  national  German  state, 

1763-1800. 

(5)  German  dualism,  1763-1866. 

2.  The  decline  and  humiliation  of  Prussia. 

A.    Inferior  character  of  the  Hohenzollems  from  Frederick  the  Great 

to  William  I,  1786-1860. 
11.    Tendency  to  rest  on  laurels  and  prestige  of  Frederick  the  Great. 

C.  The  lapse  of  Prussian  militarism. 
D     The  Napoleonic  conquest,  1806. 

3.  The  War  of  the  Liberation  and  the  Regeneration  of  Prussia. 

A.  The  administrative  and  economic  reforms  of  Stein  and  Harden- 
berg. 

B.  The  military  reformof  Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau. 

C.  The  rise  of  Prussian  nationalism — Arndt  and  Fichte. 

D.  The  War  of  the  Liberation  and  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon, 
1813. 

Required : — 

J.  H.  Robinson  and  C.  A.  Beard,  Development  of  Modern  Europe, 
vol.  I,  pp.  23-28,  55-79,  336-8;  or  C.  J.  H.  Hayes,  A  Political  and 
Social  History  of  Modern  Europe,  vol.  I,  pp.  10-14,  342-4,  347-62, 
555-7. 

Suggested: — 

J.  A.  Marriott  and  C.  G.  Robertson,  The  Evolution  of  Prussia,  pp. 
11-255. 

4.  The  attempts  to  form  a  liberal  German  national  state  under  Prussian 
leadership,  1815-1860. 

A.    Efforts  to  achieve  political  unity. 


ISSUES  OF  THE  PRESENT  WAR 


s 


(1)  Impossibility  of  adjusting  and  reconciling  Austro-Prussian 
dualism  and  German  national  unity. 

(2)  The  system  of  Metternich  and  the  defeat  of  nationalism  and 
democracy  in  Germany,  1815-1848. 

a.  The  "punctation"  of  Toplitz,  July,  1819. 

b.  The  Carlsbad  Decrees,  September,  1819 

c.  The  Vienna  SMvasakte,  May  24,  1820. 

d.  The  "Six  Articles"  June  28,  1832. 

(3)  The  Revolution  of  1848. 

a.  The  forces  leading  to  the  Revolution. 

(1)  Growth  of  middle  class  liberalism. 

(2)  The  Prussian  constitutional  crisis  of  1847. 

(3)  The  revolutions  of  1848  in  France,  Italy  and  Austria. 

b.  The  plan  for  a  united  constitutional  German  state. 

(1)  The  Heidelberg  Vorparlament  of  March  31  to  April 
4,  1848. 

(2)  The  Frankfort  Parliament,  May  18,  1848  to  June 
18,  1849. 

(a)  Its  sessions  and  program. 

(b)  Its  humilating  failure. 

(3)  The  Dreikdningsbundniss  and  the  Erfurt  Parlia- 
ment, March,  1850. 

(4)  Prince  Felix  Schwajzenberg  and  the  "humiliation 
of  Olmiitz, "  November,  1850. 

c.  Tragic  significance  of  the  failure  of  the  liberal  movement 
for  unification  in  Germany — the  discrediting  of  liber- 
alism. 

Required: — 

Hayes,  op.  cit.,  vol.  II,  pp.  13-14,  125-6,  131-2,  135-6,  141-4;  or 
C.  D.  Hazen,  Europe  Since  1816,  pp.  28-44,  145-52,  169-86;  or  J.  S. 
Schapiro,  Modern  and  Contemporary  European  History,  pp.  115-44. 
B.    Economic   unity   under   Prussian   leadership — the  Zollverein. 

(1)  The  economic  impulse  to  political  unity. 

(2)  The  precedent  of  Prussian  economic  leadership. 
Required : — 

Hayes,  II,  pp.  95-7,  125;  or  Hazen,  pp.  146-9;  or  Schapiro,  pp.  126-8 
5.    Bismarck,  "Blood  and  Iron,"  and  the  formation  of  the  Prussianized 
German  Empire. 

A.  The  German  intellectuals  favoring  Prussian  Leadership. 

(1)  The  Prussian  school  of  historians  and  political  scientists. 

B.  The  military  plans  of  William  I  and  their  object. 

C.  The  rejection  of  the  new  military  program  by  the  Prussian 
Parliament  and  the  resulting  constitutional  crisis. 

D.  Bismarck  called  as  the  "parliament  tamer." 

E.  "Blood  and  Iron,"  and  the  revival  of  Realpolitik. 


6 


CLARK  UNIVERSITY 


(1)  The  completion  of  the  army  program. 

(2)  The  plans  for  a  military  and  autocratic  unification  of 
Germany. 

a.  The  Schleswig-Holstein  affair  and  its  complications. 

b.  The  Austro-Prussian  war  of  1866  and  the  final  humila- 
tion  of  Austria. 

(1)  The  end  of  German  dualism. 

(2)  Undisputed  supremacy  of  Prussia  in  Germany. 

(3)  The  North  German  Federation,  1867-71. 
a.    The  dominant  position  of  Prussia. 

(4)  Necessity  for  another  foreign  war  to  weld  the  South  German 
States  to  the  Northern  Federation. 

a.  The  Hohenzollern  candidature  and  the  Spanish  crown. 
(1)  The  mission  of  Lothar  Bucher  to  Madrid. 

b.  The  dispute  with  France — the  "Ems  telegram." 

c.  The  Franco-Prussian  War  and  the  alliance  with  South 

Germany. 

F.    Formation  of  the  German  Empire,  1871. 

(1)  Dominant  position  of  Prussian  power  and  policy  and  of 

Bismarck  as  imperial  chancellor  and  president  of  the  Prussian 

ministry. 
Required : — 

Hayes,  II,  pp.  180-206;  or  Hazen,  pp.  240-71,  285-302;  or  Schapiro, 
pp.  169-194. 

V.    The  Prussianizing  of  the  German  Empire,  1870-1890. 

1.  The  new  imperial  constitution. 

2.  The  consolidating  laws. 

3.  The  adoption  of  the  Prussian  military  system  in  the  Empire. 

A.    Continuance  of  "Parliament  taming." 

4.  The  persecution  and  repression  of  dissident  groups. 

A.  The  Kulturkampf. 

B.  Struggle  with  Social  Democracy. 

C.  The  repressed  nationalities  and  dynasties. 

5.  Autocracy  and  bureaucracy  as  opposed  to  Parliamentary  institutions. 

6.  Benevolent  despotism  and  social  legislation. 

A.  Military  background. 

B.  Paternalistic  aims. 

C.  Opposition  of  the  Liberals. 

7.  Persistence  of  Agrarian  domination — "  Junkerdom." 
Required : — 

Hayes,  II,  pp.  397-415;  or  Hazen,  pp.  303-22;  or  Robinson  and 
Beard,  II,  pp.  130-147;  or  Schapiro,  pp.  277-297;  and  Hazen,  The 
Government  of  Germany. 


ISSUES  OF  THE  PRESENT  WAR 


7 


VI.    The  Struggle  of  the  German  Empire  for  the  Hegemony  of 

Europe 

1.  Important  consequences  of  the  method  of  achieving  German  unity 
from  1860-1871. 

A.  Prestige  of  militarism  and  autocracy  and  corresponding  eclipse 
of  liberalism  and  pacific  adjustments. 

B.  Development  of  a  self-interested  military  class  or  caste  with 
great  power  in  shaping  public  sentiment  and  historical  inter- 
pretations of  German  traditions. 

C.  Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  humiliation  of  France— alleged  fear  of 
a  war  of  revanche. 

D.  Turning  of  Austrian  interests  towards  the  Balkans  for  "com- 
pensation" for  losses  in  Germany. 

Required : — 

Hayes,  II,  pp.  202-3,  691-3;  and  Charles  Seymour,  The  Diplomatic 
Background  of  the  War,  pp.  2-11. 

2.  German  foreign  policy  and  the  isolation  of  France. 

A.  Devotion  of  German  diplomacy  to  preservation  of  gains  of 
1870-71. 

B.  The  Triple  Alliance,  1879-82. 

C.  The  "reinsurance  treaties"  of  1884  and  1887  with  Russia. 

D.  English  indifference  when  sea  or  colonial  power  was  not  involved. 

E.  Temporary  success  of  the  Bismarckian  diplomacy. 
Required : — 

S.  B.  Harding,  The  Study  of  the  Great  War,  A  Topical  Outline,  pp. 
13-14;  and  Hayes,  II,  pp.  692-7;  or  Hazen,  pp.  319-22;  or  Schapiro, 
pp.  684-90;  and  A  League  of  Nations,  Vol.  I,  No.  4,  April,  1918, 
pp.  176-86;  and  Seymour,  pp.  12-37,  115-39;  or  Arthur  Bullard, 
The  Diplomacy  of  the  Great  War,  pp.  13-23;  or  A.  C.  Coolidge,  The 
Origins  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  passim. 

3.  German  Weltpolitik. 

A.  The  Industrial  Revolution  in  Germany. 
(1)  Professor  Veblen's  interpretation. 
Required: — 

Hayes,  II,  pp.  416-17;  and  Schapiro,  pp.  297-306;  or  F.  A.  Ogg, 
The  Economic  Development  of  Modern  Europe,  pp.  218-34:  or 
Thornstein  Veblen,  Imperial  Germany  and  the  Industrial  Revolu- 
tion, pp.  82-3;  144-203. 

B.  Influence  of  German  industrial  development  in  stimulating  the 
new  German  imperialism. 

Required : — 

Hayes,  II,  pp.  547-60;  and  Seymour,  pp.  61-78;  and  Schapiro, 
pp.  306-7. 

C.  Chancellor  Hohenlohe  and  a  "forceful"  German  world  policy, 
1894-1900. 


8 


CLARK  UNIVERSITY 


(1)  The  mystic  and  sentimental  attraction  of  the  sea  for  Emperor 
William  II. 

D.  Lateness  of  German  entry  into  the  "colonial  scramble." 

(1)  Great  divergence  between  extent  of  German  colonial  holdings 
and  the  relative  prestige  of  Germany  on  the  European 

continent. 
Required: — 

Hayes,  II,  pp.  412-13;  and  Schapiro,  pp.  308-12;  and  Seymour, 
pp.  80-88;  and  G.  Lowes  Dickinson,  The  European  Anarchy, 
pp.  37-45;  and  Bullard,  pp.  54-60. 

Suggested : — 

Bullard,  pp.  178-205;  H.  A.  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe, 
pp.  40-47;  and  Walter  Lippman,  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy, 
pp.  87-159. 

E.  German  Weltpolitik  and  the  birth  of  the  German  navy. 

(1)  Beginnings  of  English  apprehension  and  of  Anglo-German 

tension. 
Required : — 

Hayes,  II,  pp.  422-3;  and  Seymour,  pp.  78-80;  and  Schapiro, 
pp.  312-13;  and  Bullard,  pp.  54-68;  or  R.  H.  Fife,  The  German 
Empire  Between  Two  Wars,  pp.  50-71. 
Suggested : — 

Dickinson,  pp.  68-77;  Holt  and  Chilton,  European  History, 
1862-1914,  pp.  299-302;  and  B.  E.  Schmitt,  England  and  Ger- 
many, 1740-1914,  pp.  139-218. 

F.  Weltpolitik  and  the  diplomatic  crises,  1890-1914. 

(1)  Africa. 

a.  Adjustment  with  Great  Britian,  1890. 

b.  Revival  of  Anglo-German  tension  in  the  Boer  WTar. 

c.  Morocco  and  tension  with  the  French. 

(1)  Tangier  and  the  Algeciras  Congress,  1905-6. 

(2)  The  Casablanca  affair,  1908. 

(3)  The  Agadir  incident,  1911.    The  Franco-German 
convention  November,  1911. 

Required : — 

Harding,  pp.  14-16;  and  Hayes,  II,  pp.  704-6;  or  Schapiro, 
pp.  687-90,  700-2;  and  Dickinson,  pp.  108-15;  and  Seymour, 
pp.  170-76;  181, 186-192;  or  Gibbons,  pp.  71-85;  or  Bullard, 
pp.  84-110,  118-23. 

(2)  The  Near  Eastern  Question — the  Drang  nach  Osten  and  the 
Bagdad  Railroad  project. 

a.  The  identity  of  German-Austrian  interests  in  securing 
the  domination  of  the  Balkans  and  of  Turkey. 

b.  The  Mittel-Europa  plan. 


ISSUES  OF  THE  PRESENT  WAR 


9 


c.  The  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by  Austria 
in  1908. 

(1)  Violation  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  (1878),  and 
affront  to  Russia. 

(2)  Humiliation  of  Russia  and  Russian  plans  for  revenge 

d.  The  Bagdad  Railroad  and  the  conflict  with  England. 

(1)  Germany  ousts  England  as  the  protector  of  the 
Porte. 

(2)  Danger  to  British  India  of  a  German  port  and 
naval  base  on  the  Persian  Gulf 

(3)  Peaceful  solution  of  the  dispute,  June,  1914. 
Required : — 

Schapiro,  pp.  702-8;  and  Schmitt,  pp.  253-301;  and  Con- 
quest and  Kultur,  pp.  52-00  (and  map);  and  The  Lichnowsky 
Memorandum,  Notes,  pp.  395-7;  and  Morris  Jastrow, 
The  War  and  the  Bagdad  Railroad,  pp.  82-121;  and  Billiard, 
pp.  110-18. 
Suggested : — 

Bullard,  pp.  65-8,  196;  Dickinson,  pp.  101-8;  Gibbons, 
pp.  58-70,  368-71;  Seymour,  pp.  85-87;  The  President's 
Flag  Day  Address,  pp.  14-24.  F.  Naumann,  Central  Europe. 

Weltpolitik,    Pan-Germanism,    Junkerdom,    and   the  struggle 

against  liberalism  in  Germany. 

(1)  Union  of  new  captains  of  industry  with  the  agrarians  or 
"Junkers. " 

(2)  Identity  of  their  interests  in  promoting  militarism,  autocracy, 
and  a  vigorous  world  policy. 

(3)  Their  organizations. 

a.  The  Pan  German  League — Der  Alldeutsche  Verband, 
1890. 

b.  The  League  of  Landlords — Der  Hund  der  Landwirle,  1893. 

c.  The  Navy  League — Der  Deutsche  Flottenverein,  1898. 

d.  The  National  Security  League — Der  Nationale  Wehr- 
verein,  1911. 

(4)  Their  propaganda  and  their  influence  on  the  government. 

a.  Military  and  naval  policy. 

b.  Extension  of  Germanism  in  foreign  lands. 

c.  Financial  and  taxation  policies. 

d.  Repression  of  non-German  nationalities. 

e.  Overthrow  of  chancellors. 

f.  Opposition  to  liberalism  and  constitutionalism. 

g.  Subordination  of  the  civil  power  to  the  military. 

h.  War-scare  shibboleths  and  catch  phrases: — encircle- 
ment," "jealous  England,"  "barbarous  Russia," 
"revengeful  France." 


10 


CLARK  UNIVERSITY 


(5)  The  challenge  to  the  above  tendencies  in  the  growth  of 
German  liberalism— 1907-1914. 

a.    This  as  great  a  threat  to  the  military  party  as  the  en- 
circling alliances. 
Required : — 

Harding,  pp.  5-9,  22-4;  and  Hayes,  II,  pp.  410,  417-19,  420, 
423;  and  Schapiro,  pp.  314-17,  321-3;  and  Bullard,  pp.  24-35; 
and  Seymour,  pp.  89-100;  and  Dickinson,  pp.  46-57;  and 
O.  Nippold,  The  Awakening  of  the  German  People,  pp.  135-9; 
and  Conquest  and  Kullur,  pp.  86-94. 
Suggested : — 

Conquest  and  Kullur,  passim;  Bernhardi,  Germany  and  the  Next 
War,  passim;  C.  Altschul,  German  Militarism  and  Its  German 
Critics,  pp.  8-20;  E.  E.  Sperry,  The  Tentacles  of  the  German 
Octopus  in  America;  Monroe  Smith,  Military  Strategy  and 
Statecraft,  pp.  204-52;  Baron  Beyens,  Germany  Before  the  War, 
pp.  106-37;  J.  W.  Gerard,  My  Four  Years  in  Germany,  pp.  75- 
103,  111-128;  W.  S.  Davis,  The  Roots  of  the  War,  pp.  162-93, 
345-73. 

VII.    The  European  Defence  Reaction  to  the  Effort  at  German 

Hegemony 

1.  Reversal  of  German  foreign  policy  by  William  II  in  regard  to  Russia. 
A.    Bismarck's  criticism. 

2.  Early  success  at  an  Anglo-German  adjustment  which  was  disrupted 
by  German  colonial  ambitions  and  German  naval  policy. 

3.  The  Franco-Russian  agreement,  1892. 

4.  The  Anglo-French  Entente  Cordiale,  1904. 

5.  The  British-Japanese  (1902);   Franco-Italian  (1902);  Franco-Span- 
ish (1904);  and  Russo-Japanese  (1910)  agreements. 

6.  The  Triple-Entente,  1907. 

7.  The  isolation  of  Germany— Delcasse'  as  the  "Nemesis  of  Bismarck." 

8.  Resulting  strengthening  of  the  Austro-German  alliance  and  the 
Mittel-Europa  scheme. 

Required : — 

Harding,  pp.  13-14;  and  Hayes,  II,  pp.  697-703;  and  Schapiro,  pp. 
690-3;  and  George  Louis  Beer,  The  English  Speaking  Peoples,  pp. 
91-121;  and  Seymour,  pp.  140-65;  or  Bullard,  pp.  69-83;  or  A 
League  of  Nations,  vol.  I,  No.  4,  April,  1918,  pp.  192-214. 

VIII.    The  Attempt  to  Bring  About  Universal  Disarmament  and 
the  Development  of  an  International  Organization — A  Political 
and  Juridical  Challenge  to  the  Military  Hegemony  of  Germany 
1.    The  Hague  Peace  Conferences  of  1899  and  1907. 
A.    Convening  agencies. 


ISSUES  OF  THE  PRESENT  WAR 


11 


B.  Proposals. 

C.  Attitude  of  several  countries. 

(1)  German  refusal  to  consider  disarmament. 

D.  Achievements  of.the  Hague  Conferences. 

(1)  Precedent  and  a  permanent  international  court  of  arbitration. 
2.    The  evident  hopelessness  of  inducing  Germany  to  join  in,  and  co- 
operate with,  the  anti-militaristic  movement. 

A.    German  refusal  to  accept  Minister  Van  Dyke's  proposal  for  a 

third  Hague  Conference. 
Required : — 

Harding,  pp.  9-10;  Hayes,  II,  pp.  679-91;  and  Schapiro,  pp.  693-9 

and  Dickinson,  pp.  75-91. 
Suggested : — 

J.  B.  Scott,  The  Hague  Peace  Conferences;  Henry  Van  Dyke,  Fighting 
for  Peace,  pp.  3-47. 

IX.    Germany  and  the  War  ok  1914 

1.  The  two  great  aims  of  the  governing  classes  in  Germany. 

A.  Repression  of  political  liberalism  and  anti-militarism  at  home. 

B.  The  realization  ofjthe  Pan-German  and  Miltel-E uropa  programs 
in  foreign  politics. 

2.  The  two  great  obstacles  to  these  ambitions. 

A.  The  remarkable  growth  of  liberalism  and  social  democracy  in 
Germany. 

B.  The  diplomatic  isolation  of  Germany  and  its  threat  to  German 
Weltpolitik. 

(1)  The  value  of  an  immediate  European  war  in  crushing  domes- 
tic liberalism  and  foreign  opposition. 

(2)  Manifest  impossibility  of  successfully  coping  with  either  of 
these  if  the  conflict  was  delayed  for  a  decade. 

3.  The  challenge  to  the  program  of  the  German  governing  classes. 

A.  The  Triple  Entente. 

B.  The  Rise  of  the  Balkan  nationalities. 

C.  The  Jugo-Slav  movement  and  Serbian  leadership. 

D.  The  alarming  growth  of  social  democracy  in  Germany  in  spite 
of  archaic  suffrage  restrictions. 

E.  All  of  these  come  to  a  focus  in  1912  in  the  German  elections 
and  the  Balkan  wars. 

(1)  The  great  socialist  vote. 

(2)  The  defeat  of  Turkey. 
Required : — 

Harding,  pp.  16-17;  and  Schapiro,  pp.  318-21;  and  Dickinson,  pp. 
105-8;  and  Gibbons,  pp.  142-60,  263-367;  or  Hayes,  II,  pp.  515- 
39;  or  Bullard,  pp.  124-149;  or  Seymour,  pp.  194-244. 


12 


CLARK  UNIVERSITY 


4.  The  plans  and  efforts  of  Germany  and  Austria  to  strengthen  their 
position. 

A.  The  common  interest  of  Germany  and  Austria  in  combatting 
the  rise  of  Balkan  nationalism. 

B.  Austria  leads  in  combatting  the  Jugo-Slav  movement  and 
Germany  in  crushing  domestic  liberalism. 

(1)  The  bullying  of  Serbia  by  Austria  in  1908  and  1912-13. 

(2)  The  campaign  of  the  military-autocratic  party  in  Germany, 

1912-14. 

a.  Attempt  to  terrorize  the  masses  by  the  "encirclement 
theory. " 

(1)  Belgian  and  French  expert  opinion  on  the  attitude 
of  the  German  people  before  1913. 

b.  Theory  of  a  "preventive  war"  supersedes  that  of  a 
"defensive  war. " 

c.  Attempt  to  develop  a  patriotic  and  military  atmosphere 

through  great  patriotic  celebrations  glorifying  the 
military  past  and  Hohenzollern  traditions  of  Germany. 

(1)  The  peculiarly  propitious  circumstances  for  such  a 
patriotic  demonstration. 

(a)  The  100th  anniversary  of  the  Battle  of  Leipzig. 

(b)  The  25th  Anniversary  of  the  accession  of 
William  II. 

(2)  The  subsidizing  of  orators  and  sculptors. 

(3)  The  resulting  hysteria  generated  in  the  mass  of 
the  German  people. 

(4)  Evidences  of  the  control  of  the  military  class  in 
1913  and  early  months  of  1914. 

Required : — 

Dickinson,  pp.  57-68,  116-33;   Harding,  pp.  22-24;   and  Conquest 
and  Kullur,  pp.  106-36;  and  Seymour,  pp.  238-44;  and  Hayes,  II, 
pp.  425-6,  526,  707-8;  and  Gerard,  pp.  103,  388-402. 
Suggested : — 

Altschul,  pp.  20-30;  J.  B.  Scott,  Diplomatic  Documents  Relating  to 
the  Outbreak  of  the  European  War,  vol.  I,  pp.  547-554;  The  War 
Message  and  the  Facts  Behind  It,  p.  17;  Gibbons,  pp.  357-60;  368- 
74;  Hazen,  Alsace  Lorraine  under  German  Rule,  pp.  189-214;  Collected 
Diplomatic  Documents,  pp.  136-43;  Monroe  Smith,  pp.  252-68; 
Baron  Beyens,  Germany  Before  the  War,  pp.  177-202,  355-64. 

5.  Germany  and  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 

A.  Evidence  that  a  leading  purpose  of  the  German  war  party  in 
desiring  an  immediate  war  was  the  desire  to  submerge  all  classes 
and  parties  in  a  common  sentiment  of  patriotism  and  loyalty 
to  the  established  order  and  dynasty — i.  e.  to  nourish  the  prestige 
of  autocracy  and  militarism  by  new  Sadowas  and  Sedans. 


ISSUES  OF  THE  PRESENT  WAR 


13 


(1)  German  foreign  policy  in  a  more  satisfactory  condition  than 
at  any  time  since  retirement  of  Bismarck. 

a.    By  June,  1914,  all  outstanding  colonial  disputes  had 
been  settled. 

I>.    Germany's  traditional  enemies  in  the  most  weakened 
condition  for  a  quarter  of  a  century. 

(2)  Violent  opposition  of  radicals  and  socialists  to  the  military 
demonstrations  and  preparations  in  1913-14. 

(3)  All  other  methods  of  repressing  the  growth  of  German 
liberalism  had  failed. 

(4)  The  military  and  autocratic  party  seemed  likely  to  lose  all 
by  continued  peace  and  might  win  a  new  lease  of  life  by 
duplicating  the  feats  of  Moltke  and  Bismarck,  (cf.  Gerard, 
p.  103.) 

B  The  Balkan  Wars  of  1912-13  and  their  menace  to  the  Mittel- 
Europa  project. 

(1)  German  chagrin  at  collapse  of  Turkey. 

(2)  The  unsatisfactory  nature  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  to 
the  Central  Powers. 

a.  Threat  to  Austro-Hungarian  interests  in  the  Balkans. 

b.  Danger  to  German  interests  in  Turkey  and  Asia  Minor. 

(1)  Concessions  in  Asia  Minor  would  be  of  little  value 
if  Germany  were  cut  off  from  direct  communication 
with  this  district. 

(3)  Evident  determination  of  Germany  and  Austria  to  readjust 
the  Balkan  situation  according  to  their  interests  at  the 
earliest  possible  opportunity. 

a.    Preparation  for  the  appearance  of  a  satisfactory  "in- 
cident. " 

C.  Evidence  that  the  Austro-Serbian  crisis  was  but  a  welcome 
pretext  for  agressive  action  previously  planned  by  the  German 
military  leaders. 

(1)  Secret  instructions  regarding  increase  of  German  army, 
March  19,  1913. 

(2)  Austrian  proposal  to  Italy  that  Serbia  be  attacked,  August 
9,  1913. 

(3)  Army  bill  of  June  30,  1913,  increasing  size  of  German  army 
on  an  unprecedented  scale. 

(4)  Fortification  of  the  Kiel  Canal. 

(5)  Restriction  of  exportation  of  materials  used  in  manufacture 
of  munitions  of  war. 

(6)  Recall  of  reservists  from  foreign  countries. 

(7)  Great  manoeuvers  planned  for  1914  which  would  mass 
500,000  men  on  the  French  frontier. 

(8)  Aiding  plots  for  rebellion  in  the  British  Empire. 


CLARK  UNIVERSITY 


(9)  Pacifists  and  pro-German  propaganda  subsidized  in  foreign 
countries. 

(10)  War  measures  foi  coaling  of  German  naval  vessels  June, 1914 

(11)  Alleged  German  industrial  mobilization  order,  June,  1914. 
Required : — 

Harding,  pp.  19-28;   Hayes,  II,  pp.  536-9;   and  Bullard,  pp. 
150-160;  and  Schmitt,  pp.  382-88;  and  Seymour,  pp.  245-53; 
or  Holt  and  Chilton,  pp.  524-61;  or  Gibbons,  pp.  343-98. 
German  responsibility  for  the  failure  to  adjust  the  Austro- 
Serbian  crisis  of  July  1914  by  diplomacy  and  arbitration. 

(1)  The  "shining  armor"  precedent  of  1908. 

(2)  The  Potsdam  Conference  of  July  5,  1914  and  the  decision 
of  the  German  military  chiefs  for  the  precipitation  of  a 
European  war. 

(3)  German  inciting  of  Austria  to  attack  Serbia  and  German 
refusal  to  urge  Austria  to  accept  mediation. 

(4)  Germany  prevents  Austria  from  accepting  the  plans  for 
European  discussion. 

a.  Austria  weakens  on  August  1,  1914  and  offers  to  submit 
the  Serbian  dispute  to  European  conversations. 

b.  Germany  forestalls  the  possibility  of  a  peaceful  adjust- 
ment by  arrogant  ultimatums  and  summary  declaration 
of  war  on  Russia. 

Required : — 

Harding,  pp.  29-41;  and  Schapiro,  pp.  709-22;  and  Seymour, 
pp.  254-87;  or  Gibbons,  pp.  374-98. 
Suggested : — 

O.  P.  Chitwood,  The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  Great  War, 
passim;  E.  C.  Stowell,  The  Diplomacy  of  the  War  of  1914, 
passim. 

(5)  The  antecedents  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war  as  presented  in 
the  Memorandum  of  Prince  Karl  Maximilian  Lichnowsky, 
which  appeared  in  the  spring  of  1918. 

a.  The  German  ambassador  in  England  in  1914  places 
complete  responsibility  for  the  war  on  the  German 
military  party. 

Required : — 

The  Lichnowsky  Memorandum,  edited  with  Notes  by  Monroe 
Smith  and  Henry  F.  Munro. 

(6)  The  Muhlon  Memoranda. 

a.  Dr.  Wilhelm  Muhlon,  a  director  of  the  Krupp  works 
tells  of  foreknowledge  of  the  projected  war  by  German 
industrial  and  financial  leaders  early  in  July,  1914. 


ISSUES  OF  THE  PRESENT  WAR 


15 


Required : — 

The  American  Journal  of  International  Law,  April,  1918, 
pp.  397-99.  The  Memoranda  and  Letters  of  Dr.  Muhlon, 
edited  by  Monroe  Smith 

German  violation  of  international  law  and  the  shift  of  neutral  opinion 

against  Germany. 

A.  The  invasion  of  Belgium. 

B.  The  occupation  of  Luxemburg. 

C.  Use  of  forbidden  methods  of  warfare. 

D.  Terrorism  and  cruelties  to  conquered  populations. 

E.  Unrestricted  submarine  warfare. 

F.  Practical  repudiation  of  Kultur  and  Deutschtum  by  the  civilized 
world,  as  long  as  they  are  linked  with  Prussian  militarism, 
realpolitik  and  autocracy. 

(1)  German  losses  through  violation  of  international  law. 

(2)  Has  realpolitik  "paid"  in  the  "final  reckoning"? 
Required : — 

Harding,  pp.  42-51,  54-63;  and  Schapiro,  pp.  714-17;  and  Gibbons, 
pp.  399-412;  or  Monroe  Smith,  pp.  171-200. 
Suggested : — 

German  War  Practices;  German  Treatment  of  Conquered  Territory. 


